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NOTES
A Constitutional Right of Access to Pretrial
Documents: A Missed Opportunity in Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press
INTRODUCTION
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,I the Supreme Court held that
a right of public access to criminal trials is implicit within the first amend-
ment. 2 According to that decision, courts can preclude the public from
attending a criminal trial only when there are strong interests in favor of
secrecy. The Supreme Court has only applied this right to criminal pro-
ceedings, but other federal courts have noted that the Court's reasoning in
Richmond Newspapers would apply as well to civil trials. 3
Subsequent to the Richmond Newspapers decision, several lower federal
courts have had to decide whether the existence of a right of public access
to judicial proceedings also leads to finding the existence of a right of public
access to documents used in those proceedings. These cases have all been
brought by members of the press who attempted to gather information within
the documents to disseminate to the public.4 Lower courts which have faced
the issue have made their decisions using different and sometimes conflicting
reasoning.
This Note will demonstrate that public policy concerns give great weight
to finding the existence of a constitutional right of access to documents used
in all judicial proceedings. In particular, it will spotlight a recent case, In
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
I, § 1.
3. See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HLv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 415, 430 (1981) anticipated
this expansion of the Richmond Newspapers doctrine.
4. The press has been vigorous in engaging in these suits. See, e.g., In re Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Publicker, 733 F.2d
1059; In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Associated
Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). Their status as professional
news gatherers has no significance in these cases, however. "The First Amendment generally
grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public."
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
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re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,5 where the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled against finding a constitutional
right of access to pretrial documents, and show why that case should have
been decided differently. Part I examines the Richmond Newspapers decision.
Part II shows that while the Supreme Court has not yet applied the right
of access to civil proceedings, other federal courts have reasonably found
that there is a right of access to civil proceedings. Part III looks at arguments
courts have made for and against applying the right of access to civil pretrial
documents and concludes that, because of the significant benefits, a right
of access should be applied to these documents. Finally, Part IV proposes
that a sliding scale balancing test be implemented to determine when the
right of access can be overridden.
I. SUPREMiE COURT DEVELOPS RIGHT OF AccEss
A. Constitutional Basis
In a series of cases beginning with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 6
the Supreme Court established and developed a right of public access to
judicial proceedings. At least six justices believed that this right derives from
the first amendment. 7
In Richmond Newspapers a state trial court granted a criminal defendant's
motion to close his trial to the public. Although the prosecutor did not
object, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and two individual newspaper reporters
intervened and objected to the closure order. The interveners claimed the
first amendment guaranteed the public a right of access to the trial. The
state courts ruled against the interveners so they appealed to the United
States Supreme Court." The result was seven separate opinions-six finding
a constitutional right of access. 9
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, stated that the
right of access to judicial proceedings is implicit in the first amendment
5. 773 F.2d 1325.
6. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
7. See infra note 9. In separate concurring opinions Justices White and Blackmun asserted
that the sixth, not the first, amendment guarantees a right of access to criminal trials. Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581, 601.
8. Id. at 559-63.
9. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion was joined by Justices White and Stevens, who
also wrote their own separate concurring opinions. Justice Brennan's opinion concuning with
the result was joined by Justice Marshall. Justices Stewart and Blackmun each filed separate
opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Powell did not
participate in the disposition of Richmond Newspapers, but in a concurring opinion in Gannett
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979), a case with similar facts, he argued for a first
amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. Fenner & Koley, supra note 3, at 420-21,
notes that this lack of unity has made this an uncertain area of the law.
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because it gives "meaning" to the express rights of that amendment.' 0
According to the Chief Justice, freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
the right to peaceful assembly and the right to petition the government
"share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of the government."" A right of public
access to trials furthers all those express rights because "[p]lainly it would
be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and
importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
conducted."' 2
Justice Brennan, in the only other opinion joined by another justice, 3
used a different analytical framework to establish the right of access to
judicial proceedings. He noted that the first amendment is usually invoked
"to protect communication between speaker and listener," the so-called free
speech clause.' 4 Justice Brennan believed, however, that the first amendment
encompasses more than the right of free speech-it also "has a structural
role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-govern-
ment."' 5 This structural analysis granted first amendment protection to the
"process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive.' ' 6 Thus,
according to Brennan, not only was free speech protected, but the first
amendment also conferred a "right to gather information" which will con-
tribute to our "republican system of self-government."' 7 Public access to
trials "assumes structural importance" because such access enabled citizens
to gather "meaningful" information.'
B. Scope of the Right of Access
In Richmond Newspapers, Justices Burger and Brennan each declared the
existence of a right of access to criminal trials. Although each had a different
analytical basis for finding the right, both used the same two elements to
define its scope: common law tradition and public policy.
10. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. See supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See supra note 9.
14. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586-87.
15. Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 588.
17. Id. at 586-87.
18. Id. at 597-98. Fenner & Koley, supra note 3, at 426-27, sum up the justices' respective
positions:
The Chief Justice's theory, in a sentence, is that the first amendment carries
with it those protections needed to make the amendment effective. Justice Bren-
nan's theory, similarly reduced, is that the specific provisions of the first amend-
ment and the constitutional structure of our government imply certain protections
derived from the former and necessary for the preservation of the latter.
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1. Tradition
Chief Justice Burger detailed the centuries-old tradition of public access
to criminal trials. 19 The Chief Justice's research revealed that England has
had open trials since at least the thirteenth century. 20 He stated that this
tradition became "an attribute of the judicial systems of colonial America." '2 1
Justice Brennan used tradition to limit the "right to gather information"
he had enunciated in setting out his structural analysis. 22 Brennan foresaw
that persons could attempt to misuse his structural test by claiming all
information contributes to their self-governance, no matter how tenuous
their claims. 23 A tradition of a right of public access can be used as an
element to curtail overzealous application of the right because such a tradition
"implies the favorable judgment of experience." 24
2. Public Policy
In their opinions in Richmond Newspapers, Justices Burger and Brennan
were enthusiastic about the public policy benefits of open criminal trials.
Each justice listed several specific benefits which derive from open proceed-
ings; these benefits can generally be classified as monitoring, educational
and therapeutic.
Both justices believed that open trials help monitor our system of justice
because openness discourages "misconduct of [the] participants." 25 The par-
ties would be less likely to commit perjury26 and the judge would be less
likely to make a biased decision27 if the public were allowed to attend the
proceeding. Brennan stated that the right of access to trials acts as a check
upon the judiciary, "akin to the other checks and balances" present in our
system of government. 28
Burger stated that open trials serve to educate the public about both
particular cases and our system of justice in general. 29 The educational
function is the underpinning of Brennan's structural analysis, which he used
19. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69.
20. Id. at 565.
21. Id. at 567.
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588.
24. Id. at 589.
25. Id. at 569.
26. Id. at 597.
27. Id. at 569.
28. Id. at 596.
29. Id. at 572. This appears related to Justice Brennan's structural analysis but really is
not. Justice Burger felt that when the public is aware of how the judicial system operates it
will be more accepting of its decisions. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, wanted members
of the public to be well educated about government so they can better govern themselves.
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to derive the right of access.30 Brennan stated, "judges are not mere umpires,
but, in their own sphere, lawmakers.... [C]ourt rulings impose official and
practical consequences upon members of society at large. ' 31 Since a trial is
a "governmental proceeding," the happenings at a trial are of great public
interest and should be made public.32
Finally, the therapeutic value of public trials impressed Chief Justice
Burger. He believed that when the community can observe justice carried
out,. in its entire process, their natural desire for "satisfaction" of wrongs
will not be vented in an illegal manner. 3
II. EXTENSION oF Richmond Newspapers RIGHT
A. Press-Enterprise
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,34 the Supreme
Court applied the right of access first enunciated in Richmond Newspapers5
to the voir dire of a criminal trial.36 Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority
opinion37 and applied the same tradition and public policy analysis he used
in the earlier case.38 First, the Chief Justice noted that jury selection, like
the trial itself, has traditionally been open.3 9 Second, he reiterated the same
public policy benefits of open proceedings he had stated in Richmond News-
papers.40 According to Burger, these benefits also accrue at the voir dire
phase of a trial. 41 The Court held that while at times there may be special
30. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
31. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595.
32. Id. at 596.
33. Id. at 571. Thus vigilantism and other retributive instincts will be pacified. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983)
called this a "catharsis."
34. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
35. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
36. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the Supreme Court
had already extended the Richmond Newspapers doctrine once by holding that the public could
not be excluded from learning the testimony at a trial.
37. The Chief Justice captured the approval of the Court with this opinion: Justice Brennan
did not write a separate opinion and the three justices who did merely emphasized particular
points.
38. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 507-09.
39. Id. at 506-08. For example, the jury selection at the murder trial of the British soldiers
who participated in the Boston Massacre was open.
40. The Chief Justice used the monitoring, educational and therapeutic benefits. Id. at 508-
09. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
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reasons to keep personal answers of the veniremen out of the public domain,
that concern would not justify automatic closure of the voir dire. 42
The Court's failure to distinguish voir dire, a pretrial proceeding, from
the trial itself is significant. This decision showed that the right of access
announced in Richmond Newspapers is not limited to trials.
B. Civil Proceedings
Although Richmond Newspapers and Press-Enterprise concerned criminal
proceedings, the Supreme Court gave broad hints it would apply the right
of access enunciated in those cases to civil trials as well. In a footnote to
his Richmond Newspapers opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that while
a claim of a right of access to civil trials was not before the Court, "we
note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively
open." 43 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan expressly applied the
right of access equally to criminal and civil trials. 44
Several lower federal courts have had to decide the appropriateness of
applying the right of access to civil proceedings. The majority of courts
which have faced the issue have found a constitutional right of access to
civil proceedings in both the trial and the pretrial stages.45 Courts which
have decided in favor of the right of access show that the policy reasons
for keeping criminal proceedings open also apply to civil proceedings; 4 the
42. Id. at 511. Public voir dire may succumb before a "compelling interest of a prospective
juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons
for keeping out of the public domain." Id. Since this case was about the rape of a teenage
girl, Burger said that some questions about rape may have been embarrassing to potential jurors
who had themselves been raped.
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, wanted to limit the ability of potential jurors to
request privacy during voir dire even when they were being asked very personal questions.
Marshall felt there was more reason for voir dire to be public when personal matters were
discussed because the Richmond Newspapers policies are "most severely jeopardized when
courts conceal from the public sensitive information that bears upon the ability of jurors
impartially to weigh the evidence presented to them." Id. at 520.
43. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
44. Id. at 596. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart also explicitly applied the right
of access to civil trials: "the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the
public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599.
45. See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Continental
Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). See also
In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1984), where the eighth
circuit found a right of access to contempt proceedings, which it characterized as "a hybrid
containing both civil and criminal characteristics." Id. at 661. But see In re Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
46. See Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070 (a "survey of authorities identifies as features of the
civil justice system many of those attributes of the criminal justice system on which the Supreme
Court relied in holding that the First Amendment guarantees to the public and to the press
the right of access to criminal trials"); Continental Illinois, 732 F.2d at 1308 ("the policy
reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well"); Brown
& Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
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monitoring, educational and therapeutic benefits stated in Richmond News-
papers still accrue.47
One court of appeals case has declined to apply the right of access to
civil trials. The majority opinion in In re Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press,48 written by Judge Scalia, stated that it was "unlikely" that
the benefits of open proceedings "are as important in the context of civil
suits between private parties as they are in criminal prosecutions. ' 49 Un-
fortunately, the opinion failed to support this assertion.
There are two possible rationales for Judge Scalia's claim that access to
civil proceedings is not as important as access to criminal proceedings. First,
since the penalty for conviction of a crime involves a man's liberty, and
potentially every man's liberty, perhaps Judge Scalia believed the proper
conduct of criminal proceedings was more "important" than civil ones.
Second, since civil litigation almost always involves private parties, perhaps
Judge Scalia believed that the public would not benefit by having access to
private disputes. Both of these possible reasons are flawed. At times, civil
litigation is extremely important to the public: "[c]ivil cases frequently in-
volve issues crucial to the public-for example, discrimination, voting rights,
antitrust issues, government regulation, bankruptcy. 5 0 Millions of people
may be affected by precedents made at a civil trial.
Even if the consequences of a particular civil trial are not of the same
magnitude as the consequences of a criminal trial, the benefits of access to
the civil trial outweigh any known reasons for a rule automatically excluding
the public. One district court case, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
47. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
In 1983 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to give federal judges even more
power in civil cases, thus increasing the need to monitor their actions. Rule 16, concerning
pretrial management, was redrafted with the idea that today's civil litigation calls for more
involvement by the trial judge. FED. R. Cwr. P. 16 advisory committee's notes; A. MLLER,
Tim AUGUST 1983 AmNDMENTS TO TH FEDERAL RULEs OF Civr. PROCEDURE: PROMOTMG
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEmENT AND LAWYER REsPONsmiTY 21 (1984) (Miller was the Reporter
for the drafting committee of the 1983 amendments). Sections (a) and (c) of that rule direct
trial judges to concern themselves with such things as expedition of the action and facilitating
settlement. MILER, supra, at 26, states that this is the first time the word "settlement" has
been in the federal rules: "It simply recognizes the fact that settlement is now a fundamental,
basic, almost universal aspect of being a judge." Id. Rule 26 was also rewritten to give judges
more power to prevent discovery abuses. See infra note 132.
48. 773 F.2d 1325. See also infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 1337.
50. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179. See also Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
from Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596, where the Justice stated, "mistakes of fact in
civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and defendant."
See also Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d at 661:
Arguably, the public interest in securing the integrity of the fact-finding process
is greater in the criminal context than the civil context, since the condemnation
of the state is involved in the former but not the latter, it it is nonetheless true
that the public has a great interest in the fairness of civil proceedings.
1987]
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Industrial Co.51 went so far as to suggest that the right of access to judicial
proceedings should be even stronger in civil cases than criminal cases because
the concern that publicity will jeopardize a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a fair trial is rarely present in civil cases
2
.
5
III. PRETRIAL DOCUMENTS
A right of access to the documents used in judicial proceedings would be
a logical corollary to the first amendment right of access to the proceedings
themselves. 53 Some federal courts have so decided, in both civil and criminal
cases.
A. Criminal
In Associated Press v. United States District Court, 5 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the public had a first amendment right to
examine the pretrial documents from a criminal trial 55 That case was brought
by members of the press who were denied access to documents relating to
suppression hearings in the DeLorean criminal trial.5 6 The court of appeals
applied the elements of the right of access set out in Richmond Newspapers.5 7
First, the court stated that there was a tradition of access: "Et]here can be
little dispute that the press and public have historically had a common law
right of access to most pretrial documents. '58 Second, the court found public
policy benefits existed when there was a right to access: pretrial documents
"are often important to a full understanding of the way in which 'the judicial
process and the government as a whole' are functioning. ' 59 Thus, the court
concluded, "It]here is no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings
and the documents filed in regard to them."' 6
51. 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
52. Id. at 897 n.55.
53. See generally Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84
CoLumr. L. Rav. 1813 (1984); Comment, Access to Trial Exhibits in Civil Suits: In re Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 60 ST. Jont's L. REv. 358 (1986).
54. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 1145.
56. Id. In an earlier case, United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982), this
circuit first found that the right of access applied to a criminal suppression hearing. But see
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-81 (1979), where, before Richmond Newspapers
was decided, the Supreme Court held there was no sixth amendment right of access to a
suppression hearing because the evidence, if it is suppressed, should not be disseminated.
57. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
58. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
59. Id., quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
60. Id. at 1145.
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B. Civil
Although the Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny,6'
did not expressly acknowledge a right of access to pretrial documents in civil
proceedings, finding such a right is consistent with the reasoning of the
Court's decisions. At least two circuits, the sixth 2 and the seventh,63 have
recognized a constitutional right of access to pretrial documents, while the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia doubts that the right exists.64
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,65 a tobacco company
went to court to challenge the Federal Trade Commission's proposed changes
in its methodology for testing the level of pollutants within cigarettes. Upon
requests by both parties, the district court placed all documents filed by the
agency under seal, preventing public access.6 A public interest organization,
the Public Citizen Health Research Group, appealed this action. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, relying upon the first amendment and the
common law, held that the trial court's seal was improper. The decision
stated that the trial court must justify nondisclosure before it can seal
documents.6 7
In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation6 arose when shareholders
of a bank, which was facing severe financial losses, brought a derivative
action to compel the bank to assert any claims it may have had against third
parties. The bank's directors formed a Special Litigation Committee to
evaluate the derivative claims. The Committee drafted a report which rec-
ommended that the claims against most of the potential defendants be
dropped. The trial judge, in deciding the disposition of the derivative suits,
agreed with the Committee's report only with respect to some of the potential
defendants.6 9
Reporters for The Wall Street Journal and the Chicago Sun-Times, who
had been covering the bank's situation, requested a copy of the Committee's
report. The trial judge ordered that any materials he had considered should
be made public, including the Committee's report.70 The bank appealed this
61. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
62. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
63. In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
64. In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1985). See also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which
was related to the underlying controversy in Reporters Committee. In Tavoulareas Judge Tamm
said that the Washington Post had no first amendment right of access to the documents not
used at trial. This judgment and opinion were subsequently vacated by a rehearing en banc,
737 F.2d 1170.
65. 710 F.2d 1165.
66. Id. at 1176.
67. Id.
68. 732 F.2d 1302.
69. Id. at 1304-06.
70. Id. at 1306-07.
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decision but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there
is a presumption in favor of public access to judicial records and the bank
had failed to rebut it.71
The conflict underlying Reporters Committee began when William Tav-
oulareas, the president of Mobil Oil Corp., brought a libel action against
The Washington Post and several of its employees. In the course of the
lawsuit, the Post discovered a large number of documents from Mobil, which
was a third party to the lawsuit. Mobil requested a protective order to
prevent public dissemination of the information it had provided, stating that
the information contained trade secrets. The district court granted Mobil's
motion based solely upon an affidavit of one of the corporation's vice-
presidents who claimed, in general terms, that release of the documents could
injure Mobil's shipping business and its relations with Saudi Arabia.7 2
Although the Post did not object to the court's decision, four reporters
and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press" filed a motion to
intervene in order to ask the court to rescind the protective order. The
district court declined to reconsider the protective orders; it did state, how-
ever, that thirty days after completion of the trial it would hold a hearing
and require Mobil to explain' why the materials were confidential. 74
At the post-trial hearing Mobil waived most of its confidentiality claims
and the district court disallowed the remaining ones. Even though they then
had access to all the materials, the Reporters Committee still appealed the
initial decision not to lift the protective orders. 75 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Scalia, held that there
was no first amendment right of access to materials not used in the trial,
even ones which the judge relied upon in considering a motion for summary
judgment. He further stated that sealing the trial exhibits until the completion
of the trial did not violate a common law right of public access. 76 In his
dissent, Judge Wright agreed that there was no right of access to the materials
used before the trial, but he argued that there is a right of contemporaneous
access to the trial exhibits. 77
Although the facts of Reporters Committee are different than those of
Brown & Williamson and Continental Illinois, the underlying issue is the
71. Id. at 1304.
72. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326-28.
73. This is an association of news reporters devoted to the protection of first amendment
rights.
74. The trial judge felt it would be too disruptive to stop the trial to decide the intervener's
claims. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1327.
75. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that the issue was not moot
since the question of prejudgment release was capable of repetition and would evade review if
they did not rule upon it. Id. at 1328-30. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
546 (1976).
76. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1336.
77. Id. at 1341.
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same. Thus, factual differences alone do not explain the different results.
In light of the evidence of a tradition of public access to pretrial documents
and the strong public policy arguments in favor of such a right, federal
courts should decline to follow Reporters Committee's lead and instead
acknowledge the existence of the right.
1. Tradition
All courts which have dealt with the issue, even those which deny the
existence of a constitutional right of access to pretrial documents, recognize
that there is a common law tradition of public access to some pretrial
documents.7 8 To support this common law tradition, most courts have relied
upon a statement by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc.:79 "[it is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents." ' 0
In deciding against a right of access to pretrial documents, however, the
majority in Reporters Committee did not accept this generalization by the
Supreme Court. In his opinion Judge Scalia made a distinction according
to when the right of access attaches. Scalia stated that not only is there no
tradition of access to documents before the trial is completed, in reality the
opposite tradition exists; Scalia believed there is a "prejudgment nonaccess
rule."s"
The support cited by Scalia for his "nonaccess rule" shows that his
proposition is tenuous at best. The judge relied upon nineteenth century
78. See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The existence
of a common law right of access to judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records is
beyond dispute."); Continental Illinois, 732 F.2d at 1308; Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145;
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
Even Judge Scalia, in Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1333, stated, "we take it as a given
that there is a tradition of public access to court records." Judge Scalia quarreled with the
other courts about when this right attaches, however. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
For commentary doubting a common law right, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 61 CoRNELL L. Rav. 1 (1983).
79. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
80. Id. at 598. This language is cited by Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145, for example.
In Nixon, Warner Communications sought access to the tape recordings which were used in
the criminal trial of several of the ex-President's aides. The press had already received transcripts
of the tapes and heard them played but they also wanted physical access so they could copy
them. The Supreme Court held that the freedom of the press clause in the first amendment
did not compel allowing the press physical access to the tapes. Id. at 610. Several factors make
Nixon non-controlling as to the determination of a right of access to pretrial documents. First,
that action was brought under the freedom of the press clause, not a claim of a right of access.
Second, in that case the interveners wanted to handle the actual evidence during the trial, which
would interfere with the proceedings. In right of access cases the public only wants disclosure
of what is in the documents. Third, that case involved elements of executive privilege.
81. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1335-36.
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cases8 2 which hold that a trial court can prohibit its records from being used
for improper purposes, such as the publication of "the painful and sometimes
disgusting details of a diVorce case." "These cases show a tradition of judicial
discretion over the right of access, not a tradition of nonaccess before the
trial is completed.
:-2. Public Policy
All of the public policy benefits mentioned by the Court in Richmond
Newspapers when it defined the scope of the right of access to judicial
proceedings apply as well to access to pretrial documentsfr4 Access serves
the "monitoring" function because it would be difficult to review a judge's
pretrial actions without also reviewing the documents which motivated those
actions.85 The "educational" function is furthered because the public is more
likely to understand rulings and our system of justice if they may examine
the documents which underlie rulings. 6 Finally, access to the documents
serves a "therapeutic" function because the public can be more assured that
justice is done if they can observe it in its entirety.87
In Reporters Committee Judge Scalia mimmized the policy benefits of
public access to pretrial materials and stated that these interests were served
by access after the judgment. 8 Apparently the court believed that the mon-
itoring, educational and therapeutic benefits of the right of access would be
just as strong if the access comes after the judgment. Other judges believe,
however, that the public policy benefits are best served if the access is
contemporaneous. In Associated Press, which involved a crimnal proceeding,
the court required immediate access: "It]he effect of the order is a total
restraint on the public's First Amendment right of access even though the
restraint is limited in time.''89
Ultimately, because public interest in news is always at its highest when
the news is fresh, 9° reason shows that the right of access is most effective
if it is contemporaneous. Review of the participants will be stronger if it
occurs while the pretrial motions are pending.91 In addition, the goal of
82. See id.
83. In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 836 (1893), cited in Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1333.
84. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
85. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592.
86. See id. at 572, 595.
87. See id. at 571. See also Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
88. "Contemporaneity of access to written materials does not significantly enhance [the]
ability to assess the proper functiomng of the courts." Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1337.
89. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1147 See also Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1334(Wright, J., dissenting) ("the question of timing can rise to constitutional magnitude").
90. Bndges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) ("It must be recogmzed that public
interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a
generalization, however penetrating, of the histonan or scientist.").
91. Tus is the "monitonng" function. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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encouraging honesty, which should apply to the contents of documents as
well as to the testimony at a hearing, would be hampered if the documents
were not reviewed by the public for a long time, or even not at all.92 The
public is more likely to be illuminated about the judicial process, and thus
educated about our system of self-government, 93 if they can observe it as it
actually occurs. Much of today's civil litigation takes years to complete; the
benefits of a right of access would be frustrated if the public were required
to wait this long before they could review the pretrial documents. 94
IV. LIMITING RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRmTRI DOCUMENTS
In Richmond Newspapers95 and its progeny, 96 the Supreme Court stressed
that the right of access to criminal proceedings is not absolute. 97 Likewise,
all courts which recognize a right of access to pretrial documents believe
that it is not absolute. 98 The right should be limited for two reasons: first,
none of the public policy benefits of access accrue from the release of
documents very remote to the litigation; and second, other interests may
override the right of access. Because of the difficulty of evaluating the
interests in access and nonaccess, courts have applied balancing tests. 99 The
balancing tests which have been used in the past, however, gave judges much
discretion without adding guidance.'00 A sliding scale balancing test would
alleviate part of this problem. To apply this test the first step would be to
ascertain the relationship of the documents to the dispute. This establishes
how strong the presumption in favor of access should be. The next step
would be to weigh the interests in favor of nondisclosure in light of that
presumption.
A. Relationship to Dispute: Sliding Scale
In the early stages of litigation, many of the materials produced through
discovery prove ultimately to be irrelevant to the dispute.101 It would be a
92. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. The "educational" function. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
94. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101
F.R.D. 34, 39 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
95. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
96. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
97. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984); Richmond News-
papers, 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Con-
tinental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1313 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 F.R.D. 34, 38 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
99. See, e.g., Continental Illinois, 732 F.2d at 1313, Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at
41; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
100. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
101. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09 (1984).
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hardship on the producing party to expose irrelevant documents, which may
contain sensitive or embarrassing information, to the public merely because
that person had the misfortune of becoming a party to a lawsuit." 2 Thus, it
becomes difficult to decide to which documents the right of access should
attach. 103 This task is especially difficult since every lawsuit is different and
each document occupies a unique position in the dispute.
One case, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., 0 4
attached the right of access only to documents the judge expressly relied
upon, believing this would satisfy the monitoring and educational goals of
the right of access. 05 This approach is reasonable, but at times it could be
incomplete-as the district court in In re Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation'0 6 noted, "documents that the judge should have considered or
relied upon, but did not, are just as deserving of disclosure as those that
actually entered into the judge's decision.' 'lec Unfortunately, while pointing
out the Zenith decision's weakness, Petroleum Products did not offer a
solution. Without allowing access to all documents, even the irrelevant ones,
it would be impossible to determine which documents the judge "should"
have relied upon but did not. The judge cannot be trusted to make this
determination himself-he would be unlikely to admit there was relevant
information he did not consider in making his decision.
A sliding scale test would be an effective way to deal with the different
natures of pretrial documents. Since two important goals of the right of
In Rhinehart, a newspaper, which was a defendant to a defamation action, was prohibited
from disseminating information within documents it had obtained from its opponent through
discovery. Id. at 2202-04, 2207-08. The Court stated: "[a] litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit." Id. at 2207.
This statement seems to preclude a right of access to pretrial documents-a close reading of
Rhinehart, however, shows that this is not the case. Even though the Court used the language
of the right of access, it decided this case based upon free speech principles. The Court felt
that in this case the trial judge properly limited the defendant's freedom of speech because the
interests in orderly discovery were greater than the defendant's first amendment right to
disseminate the information. Id. at 2208. See In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Judge Scalia states nonapplicability of Rhinehart
to right of access issue).
The Rhinehart decision does have implications upon the right of access issue, however. Justice
Brennan, in Richmond Newspapers, implied that the right of free speech is even greater than
the right of access to judicial proceedings. 448 U.S. at 587. If, in a case like Rhinehart, a
party has no right of free speech to disseminate information within discovered documents, it
would be unreasonable to allow the public, a third party, to examine the documents in the
courthouse. Thus, if a party demonstrates a valid reason to limit his opponent's freedom of
speech, he has also effectively demonstrated a reason to limit the right of public access.
102. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2208-09.
103. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 897; Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 42-43.
104. 529 F. Supp. 866.
105. Id. at 900-01.
106. 101 F.R.D. 34.
107. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
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access are monitoring the judge'0 and educating the public, 1' 9 a strong
presumption of access should attach to any documents upon which the judge
relied. We should also take advantage of the fact that our adversarial system
pressures parties to bring relevant information before the court; almost as
strong a presumption of access should attach to documents to which the
litigants, in the proceedings, have referred." 0 This would ease the fears of
judicial negligence pointed out in Petroleum Products. Finally, the pre-
sumption of access to documents to which neither the judge nor the parties
have referred should be weak, unless there are indications that the parties
have not vigorously prosecuted their claims.
The proposed sliding scale test can be used in conjunction with a balancing
test to determine when claims of an interest in confidentiality should prevail.
B. Interests in Confidentiality: Balancing Test
Because the right of access to pretrial documents has a constitutional
dimension, the burden should be on the party seeking to restrain that right."'
Such a party's burden is not easy: "doubts must be resolved in favor of
the Newspapers." 112 The Zenith court set out a comprehensive balancing
test. First, the party seeking confidentiality must specifically show why the
documents should remain private."' Second, that party must show that a
less restrictive means, such as exclusion of a part of the documents, would
not also effectively meet the confidentiality concerns. 14 Third, the party
must show that a protective order will protect the confidentiality interest." 5
After the party seeking confidentiality satisfies these steps, the judge will
determine whether the claims of confidentiality have overcome the pre-
sumption of a right of access to the documents. Although every case will
be unique, certain factors which lead to a ruling either for or against public
access frequently recur and should be examined.
1. Public Interest in Documents
Three courts, in deciding to grant access to pretrial documents, were
influenced by the particular public interest in their disputes-both in its
108. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
110. Accord Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979) ("In short, our adversary
system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the public interest is fully
protected by the participants in the litigation.").
111. Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 43.
112. Continental Illinois, 732 F.2d at 1313.
113. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 914. See also Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 43.
114. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 914. See also Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
115. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 915.
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subject matter and in the identity of the parties. In Petroleum Products, the
action was brought by the attorney generals of several states who charged
major oil companies with conspiring to create the oil shortage in the 1970's.116
The court allowed access, stating that not only were millions of Americans
affected if the charges were true, but that since the charges were brought
by state officials, the public would want to observe how well they prosecuted
the claims." 17 Likewise, in Zenith, an antitrust action, and Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.," 8 a suit brought by a tobacco manufacturer
challenging F.T.C. regulations concerning the content of pollutants in ciga-
rettes, the controversies involved millions of consumers." 9 Plus, in Zenith,
because of the nature of the action, the plaintiffs had the responsibility to
"vindicate societal interests as well as their own."' 20 These cases demonstrate
that when such societal concerns are present, the presumption of a right of
access is almost insurmountable.
2. Interest in Confidentiality
There are several legitimate reasons to deny public access to certain pretrial
documents. The documents may contain information relating to national
security, confidential investigative information12' or evidentiary privileges.12
Likewise, the right to a fair trial and the need to keep the proceedings
orderly may demand limiting the right of access to documents. 23
In much of today's civil litigation, a party seeking confidentiality will try
to shield the contents of documents by claiming they contain trade secrets.124
Both the common law'2 5 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) 2 6
116. Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 36-37.
117. Id. at 39.
118. 710 F.2d 1165. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
119. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 905; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180 ("The subject of
this litigation potentially involves the health of [all] citizens" who smoke cigarettes.) See also
Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 39 ("If these charges prove true, the defendant's illegal
conduct has affected the lives of all Americans.").
120. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 905.
121. Fenner & Koley, supra note 3, at 441-43.
122. The Continental Illinois court wrestled with claims of attorney-client privilege. Conti-
nental Illinois, 732 F.2d at 1314.
123. In Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600, Justice Stewart said that there are "time,
place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of the First Amendment freedoms." Thus,
for example, a right of access to judicial proceedings can be limited by such things as the
available space in the courtroom. See generally Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S.
589, 608-10 (1978).
124. See, e.g., Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326; Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at
36.
125. See Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 895. See also Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1330.
126. Federal Rule 26 reads, in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person ... [such] that a trade secret ... or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ....
FED. R. Cv. P. 26(c)(7).
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recognize that commercial enterprises have an interest in keeping sensitive
information confidential. This claim to confidentiality is often abused, how-
ever. 2 7 Courts should closely examine a business's claim that documents
contain trade secrets. "Simply showing that the information would harm
the company's reputation is not sufficient to overcome the strong common
law presumption in favor of public access to court proceedings and rec-
ords."'2 A company seeking nondisclosure of its documents cannot meet
its burden merely by showing its public relations will be injured. 29
C. Administrative Burdens
If a trial judge is not careful, the right of access could lead to great
administrative burdens. In a large, complex case, document-by-document
rulings by the court could take years. 30 This threat can be alleviated if the
courts remember that the burden is upon the party seeking confidentiality.'
In his dissent in Reporters Committee, Judge Wright reasonably said that
if a party waits until the eve of the trial to file documents, and if it would
be disruptive to examine them one by one, then that party should bear the
consequences-the documents should be disclosed.1 2 Furthermore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 give the trial judge the authority to
"manage" the parties in the pretrial stage. 3 3 Thus, judges can work to
prevent being deluged with paper from parties who wait too long to file or
who claim an excessive number of documents are confidential.
CONCLUSION
If the sliding scale balancing test proposed by this Note were applied to
the facts of Reporters Committee, 14 the court would probably have to allow
access. Since the documents in question there were used at trial or were
submitted to the judge in connection with a motion for summary judgment,
127. For example, Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326-28, reports that in that case over
3800 pages of depositions and numerous documents were temporarily protected from disclosure
because Mobil claimed they contained trade secrets. Ultimately, every item was disclosed. Mobil
even tried to limit access to documents actually used at the trial even though those same
documents were already available to the public through other means, and thus not secret at
all.
128. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
129. Petroleum Products, 101 F.R.D. at 40.
130. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1338, 1341.
131. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
132. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1345 (Wright, J., dissenting) ("constructive waiver").
133. The 1983 amendments to the federal rules require district courts to take an active role
in discouraging discovery abuse. "The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the
discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-
regulating basis." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes. See supra note 47.
134. In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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a strong presumption of openness would attach to them. Although some of
the documents may have contained trade secrets, that is not a good enough
reason to seal them all. Plus, there was no showing that less restrictive
measures were not possible. Because the party seeking confidentiality waited
until just before trial to bring its confidentiality claims before the court, it
should have to bear the consequences of the court not having time to rule
on each document.
The majority in Reporters Committee chose to minimize the right of access
to pretrial documents. Although confusion about the right of access to
judicial proceedings is understandable, it is regrettable that this decision
works to deprive the public of valuable information about our system of
laws. It would have been possible for the court to fashion a solution so that
both the public's and the parties' interests were served. Unfortunately, that
was not the case.
DANIEL J. Kopp
